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2Ever since Nicolai Gogol wrote The Overcoat, in 1841,1  if not 
before, people have been aware that bureaucratic government, 
regularly, if not inevitably, generates a unique form of oppression.  
But what precisely is the nature of that oppression?  After all, pre-
bureaucratic government cannot be described as unfailingly kind to 
ordinary people.  There is apparently something about administrative 
government that breeds a form of oppression that prior governments 
were unable to discover, but that we perceive as a ubiquitous, 
virtually inherent aspect of the government we currently possess. But 
if this form of oppression is so widespread, and so intrinsic, what are 
the chances that we would ever be able to eliminate it? 
This article is an attempt to discern the sources of bureaucratic 
oppression and suggest some procedural mechanisms that might 
ameliorate the problem.  It focuses specifically on the quotidian 
oppression to which ordinary individuals are subject in their dealings 
with the modern administrative state.2  Part I discusses the sources of 
bureaucratic oppression, noting that these sources are built into the 
structure of administrative agencies.  Part II then identifies and 
analyzes three proposed solutions that collectively reflect a wide 
variety of academic disciplines.  The first is the imposition of due 
process requirements, which is based largely on legal analysis.  The 
second is a shift to client-centered management, which draws on 
management theory and the sociology of institutions.   The third is 
reliance upon market or quasi-market mechanisms, based on insights 
drawn from microeconomics.  All these approaches suffer from 
serious limitations, however, particularly because the sources of 
bureaucratic oppression are so structural in nature.  In response, Part 
III suggests an alternative approach, drawn from phenomenology, 
psychology and organization theory.   Its goal is to alter bureaucratic 
attitudes by making the agency=s clients directly and specifically 
dangerous to its employees. 
1
  Nocolai Gogol, The Overcoat, in Tales of Good and Evil 233 (David 
Magarshack, trans., 1957)
2
  It does not deal with the oppression of corporate entities, such as business firms.  
It is not clear whether the idea of oppression has any precise meaning in connection 
with a corporate entity; if it does, the problems it raises are sufficiently distinct to 
be usefully regarded as a separate topic.  
3I.   The Sources of Bureaucratic Oppression 
The climactic scene of Gogol=s Overcoat occurs after the theft 
of Akaky Akakyevich=s newly-made overcoat, on which he had 
lavished his life savings.  Akaky, a timid, impecunious government 
clerk, is advised that if he goes to the police, he will never get his 
overcoat back because he will be unable to prove that it is his.  
Instead, he should apply to a higher official, a Very Important Person, 
who can intercede on his behalf.  This Very Important Person, 
however, has received a visit from a childhood friend, whom he 
wants to impress, when Akaky appears.  After making Akaky wait 
outside his office for an inordinate length of time, he allows him to 
come in and state his request. A>What do you mean, sir?=@ he thunders 
to Akaky.   A>Don=t you know the proper procedure?  What have you 
come to me for?  Don=t you know how things are done?  In the first 
place you should have sent a petition about it to my office.  Your 
petition, sir, would have been placed before the chief clerk, who 
would have transferred it to my secretary, and my secretary would 
have submitted it to me . . .=@ 3  Further admonitions of this kind 
reduce Akaky to a state of nervous collapse; he is carried out of the 
office, succumbs to a fever, and dies. 
We are all familiar with the same phenomenon in less 
melodramatic form.  There we stand, on the linoleum floor of a 
shoddy-looking office, underneath florescent lights suspended from 
the acoustical tiles on the ceiling.  After a half-hour wait, we find 
ourselves standing across the metal counter from a bored, surly 
government clerk, who informs us that we have been standing on the 
wrong line, and that we must go to the back of another equally long, 
equally slow-moving line.  >No,@ we are told, it can=t be helped.  
AEvery one has to follow the same rules.  There=s nothing I can do 
about it.@ 4  The experience is disconcerting in itself, and perhaps 
particularly disconcerting in a consumer-oriented society where other 
institutions that deal with individuals, most particularly private firms, 
strive to provide friendly, cheerful service.5
3
  Gogol, supra note [ ], at 263
4
  See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why 
They Do It 113 (1989).
5 George Ritzer, The McDonaldization of Society: An Investigation into the 
Changing Character of Contemporary Social Life (1993); Amy Wharton, Service 
4These two incidents, whose consequences range from the 
tragic to the irritating, reflect several of the basic elements of 
bureaucratic oppression: status differences, stranger relations, 
institutional pathologies, and divergent incentives. For purposes of 
the following discussion, bureaucratic oppression can be defined as 
action by particular administrative agents that imposes unnecessary 
and harmful burdens on private parties.  This definition refers to a 
broad range of behaviors; for example, it is not limited to illegal 
action.6   It certainly includes an unjustified fine, or a burdensome 
inspection that violates the agency=s own protocols. 7  But it also 
includes dogged insistence on following the rules when doing so 
imposes burdens for no purpose, like forcing people to stand in 
multiple, ambiguously labeled lines, or imposition of formal rules in 
an excessively abusive and punitive manner, as in Gogol=s Overcoat.
The definition, however, excludes enactment of a rule, not 
because rules cannot be oppressive in some ordinary language sense, 
but because whatever harms rules impose are distinguishable form the 
harms imposed by individual government agents.  Rules are relatively 
high-profile administrative actions, affecting groups of people, and 
groups have political means of protecting themselves.  A related 
exclusion is the sense of oppression, again in the ordinary language 
sense, that results from correct application of a rule, without any other 
abusive action.  Regulatory states necessarily impose burdens on 
various actors, or deny desired benefits to them, but this by itself 
With a Smile: Understanding the Consequence of Emotional Labor, in  Cameron 
Macdonald & Carmen Sirianni, The Service Society and the Changing Experience 
of Work, in Cameron Macdonald & Carmen Sirianni, eds., Working in the Service 
Society (1996).
6 I=m indebted to Martin Shapiro for this point.
7
 Cf.  Marshall v. Barlow=s, 436 U.S. 307 (1978).   A factory owner challenged a 
warrantless administrative search by the fire marshal on Fourth Amendment 
grounds.  The Court held that an administrative search requires a warrant, but that 
the agency could obtain the warrant by demonstrating that it was following a regular 
inspection plan, and did not need to show probable cause.  Clearly, a factory owner 
whose property is searched because she is a Republican, or because she criticized 
the inspecting agency in public, is a victim of bureaucratic oppression.  The Court 
was attempting to address this problem through its warrant requirement.  But the 
search would be oppressive even if it did not require a warrant, or if the factory 
owner had agreed to it.
5cannot be regarded as a problem that needs to be solved.  Within its 
defined category of governmental action, the article is further limited 
to the bureaucratic oppression of individuals, and does not consider 
oppression of business firms or other organizations.  The reason for 
this further limitation is simply that the two cases are distinguishable, 
and that either one is a sufficiently large topic for a single article.  
Oppression of individuals has been selected because it seems more 
serious, and because it is more easily described.  It is an important 
enough problem to justify imposition of the proposed solution; 
whether oppression of firms should be addressed at all, and whether 
the same mechanism could be used for doing so, is a matter that is left 
for consideration at another time.
A.  Status Differences   
Government officials have generally occupied high status 
positions in most societies throughout the course of history.   During 
the early feudal era in the Western world, the social and governmental 
hierarchy were virtually identical.   The king was the head of 
government precisely because he had the highest social status, that is, 
he was the feudal overlord of the nobility.8    The social status of the 
nobility, in turn, was defined by their position as feudal lords, and this 
position simultaneously made each of them the official ruler of a 
territory, or honor, and all who lived within it. 9   With the growth of 
royal government in the High Middle Ages, Renaissance and 
Reformation periods, a class of officials who were separate from the 
8
Antony Black, Political Thought in Europe 137-39(1992); Joseph Canning, A 
History of Medieval Political Thought 300-1450, at 47-59, 93-95 (London: 
Routledge, 1996); Heinrich Fichtenau, Living in the Tenth Century (Patrick Geary, 
trans., 1991), at 157-64; Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age 30-
37(Frederic Maitland, trans., 1938).   The idea that the king ruled by divine right, 
thereby deriving his authority from God, was not inconsistent with the idea that 
kingship was defined as the apex of the social hierarchy because this hierarchy was 
itself regarded as divinely ordered.  See Gierke, supra;  Ernst Kantorowicz, The 
King=s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (1957)
9
  Marc Bloch, Feudal Society 145-344 (L.A. Manyon, trans., 1961); Fichtenau, 
supra note [ ], at 135-56; F.L. Ganshof, Feudalism (Philip Grierson, trans., 1996).  
As Fichtenau points out, the term Ahonor@ originally referred to an office but came 
to refer to the property of the nobles during the feudal period.  Supra at 141.
6landed nobility began to emerge, but these officials often had noble 
backgrounds,10 and in any case they quickly acquired a high status of 
their own, which was often formalized by grants of land and titles.11
The French practice of selling governmental offices had the natural 
effect of transforming appointed officials into a hereditary nobility.12
With the advent of the administrative state and the rapid 
development of industrial wealth in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, a much more definitive separation between 
status and official position occurred.  According to Weber=s classic 
definition, bureaucratic government is characterized by full-time 
employees who are compensated by regular salaries, rather than by 
the fees they collect.13  All but the most high-ranking employees are 
selected on the basis of merit, thus precluding selection based directly 
on status.  Conversely, industrialization shifted the primacy locus of 
wealth, and ultimately status, away from the landed nobility who 
exercised governmental or quasi-governmental authority over defined 
territories, and to a group of persons who, while perfectly content to 
influence the government in their favor, defined themselves as private 
10
  Jonathan Dewald, The European Nobility 1400 B 1800, at 97-98 (1996); 
Jonathan Dewald, Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture: 
France 1570-1715 (1993); Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and 
Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815 (1966)
11
  Ernest Baker, The Development of Public Services in Western Europe 1660-
1930, at 9-11 (1966); James Collins, The State in Early Modern France 132-40 
(1995); Wolfram Fischer & Peter Lundgreen, The Recruitment and Training of 
Administrative and Technical Personnel, in Charles Tully, The Formation of 
National States in Western Europe 492  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press 
1975);  Ellery Schalk, From Valor to Pedigree: Ideas of Nobility in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries (1986).
12
  Richard Bonney, The King=s Debts 1-28 (1981); Thomas Ertman, Birth of the 
Leviathan 100-110 (1997); Martin Wolfe, The Fiscal System of Renaissance 
France (1972). 
13
  Max Weber, Economy and Society 956-63, 969-83 (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich, eds., 1978); see Clive Church, Revolution and Red Tape: The French 
Bureaucracy 1770-1850 (1981); Fritz  Morstein Marx, The Administrative State: 
An Introduction to Bureaucracy (1957); Fischer & Lundgreen, supra note [ ] 
7persons.14  These developments, combined with the massive growth of 
government in the administrative era, produced a group of official 
functionaries with relatively low social status.
But the precise social status of administrators, and the 
consequences of that status, are complex.15  Regulatory officials, who 
often deal with corporate executives, land owners, of professionals, 
are in a socially ambiguous position.  On the one hand, many of those 
they regulate, particularly corporate executives,  possess higher social 
status; on the other hand, their authority, their ability to impose 
sanctions, enhances their status beyond that which their title or salary 
might suggest.  Officials who provide benefits or services, such as 
welfare workers, social security administrators, teachers, doctors, 
nurses, and police are located somewhere in the middle of the social 
hierarchy.  In an upper middle class suburb, teachers and police are 
socially subordinate to those they serve, although they also benefit 
from the authority of their position, and in many cases, from their 
professional status.  In an impoverished area, whether urban or rural, 
they are clearly superior. 16  Officials who deal with the poor because 
of the intrinsic nature of the task, such as welfare workers, are 
unambiguously superior because they themselves have higher status, 
14
  E.J. Hobsbawn, The Age of Revolution 1789B1848, at 44-73, 202-17 (1962);  
Patrick O'Brien and Roland Quinault, eds., The Industrial Revolution and British 
Society (1993);  Peter Stearns,  The Industrial Revolution in World History (1993). 
 For contemporary reflections of this mentality, see Milton Friedman, Capitalism 
and Freedom (1962);  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).
15
  For discussions of parallel complexities in private enterprise, see, e.g., Stephen 
Fineman, Organizations as Emotional Areas, in Stephen Fineman, ed., Emotion in 
Organizations (2nd ed. 2000; Greta Paules, Dishing It Out: Power and Resistance 
Among Waitresses in a New Jersey Restaurant (1991)
16 A particularly dramatic example of this shift in relative status involves the 
police, who tend to be service-oriented in wealthy suburban community and 
enforcement-oriented in an impoverished inner city one.  See Jerome Skolnick, 
Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society (2nd ed. 1975); 
S.E. Martin, Police Force or Police Service?  Gender and Emotional Labor, 561 
Annals Am. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci. 111 (1999).  Cf. Barbara Stenross & Sherryl 
Kleinman, The Highs and Lows of Emotional Labor: Detectives Encounters With 
Criminals and Victims, 17 J. Contemp. Ethnography 435 (1989) (detectives exhibit 
distinctly different demeanors when dealing with suspects than they do when 
dealing with victims).
8and because their clients are automatically placed in a socially 
subordinate position by the benefits being provided to them.  
In short, public officials in the modern administrative state are 
not automatically superior to those they govern, in the manner of 
feudal lords or Gogol=s Very Important Person, but they are often 
superior in particular situations.  Wherever such superiority occurs, it 
carries with it substantial opportunities for oppression.  This 
oppression consists of scorn, peremptory treatment, a failure to 
empathize with the person involved and most seriously, unwillingness 
to perform the assigned task of benefit distribution, education or 
protection.   It can be obvious and open, 17 or it can be rather subtle, 18
but it is always hurtful, and often harmful to both the individual and 
the social interest that the relevant legislation was designed to foster.
In his study of the Social Security Administration, Jerry 
Mashaw observed that retired people were generally treated 
respectfully and conscientiously.19   This is consistent with the idea 
that status differences are partially responsible for bureaucratic 
oppression.   While poor people, unemployed people, orphans, and 
other recipients of government benefits are generally low status 
persons B that is, lower than public officials B social security 
recipients are not.  Everyone grows old, including the wealthy, the 
well-connected and the skillfully vociferous.  Moreover, social 
security is not regarded as welfare, but as a return on payments made 
by working people, which is exactly what President Roosevelt 
intended when he crafted the program.20  These features confer status 
17
See Malcolm Feeley, The Process is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower 
Criminal Court (1978)
18
  See Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday 
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G in Alex Hurder, et al., eds, .Clinical 
Anthology: Readings for Live Client Clinics (1997).
19 Jerry Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims 
(1983). Roger Noll suggested this example to me. 
20 Francis Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew 188-89 282-85 (1946); Arthur 
Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal 308-15 (1959).  When told that the 
employee contribution feature of his plan reflected unsound economics, Roosevelt 
replied that the taxes were not based on economics, but politics.  AWe put those 
payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political 
right to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits.  With those taxes in 
9on social security recipients, and thus serve to secure respectful 
behavior by the agency.
B.  Stranger Relations
A closely related problem is that the individual with whom a 
government official is dealing in the modern administrative state is 
likely to be a stranger.  In the pre-administrative era, the inherent 
oppressiveness of the status differences between rulers and their 
subject was ameliorated by the highly localized nature of social 
control.  These interactions and, indeed, virtually all interactions, 
occurred within the confines of a village or a manor, where the people
who were being ruled most likely spent their entire lives.  The lord, 
or, more often, the lord=s seneschal or bailiff, was likely to know 
every person whom he commanded or who applied to him for 
assistance on a personal basis, as was the parish priest who
administered aid and provided education.  While ingrown 
relationships of this sort can certainly lead to antipathy and 
resentment, there is also a human level of familiarity, and at least the 
potential for empathetic concern.  In any event, members of the local 
elite were likely to understand the needs of the lower-status people in 
their village or manor, since the two groups had spent their entire 
lives together.  Moreover, there was no need for the elite to use 
oppression to assert their social superiority, as do Gogol=s Very 
Important Person and the surly clerk behind the metal counter.  The 
status hierarchy in pre-modern localities was well established and 
well understood by all concerned.
In modern mass society, government officials who deal with 
ordinary citizens are almost invariably dealing with strangers.  A 
regulatory official may come to know the executives and attorneys in 
the firm she regulates, and she may even develop friendly relations 
with them, particularly if she intends to seek a job at that firm when 
she leaves the government.  But benefits workers, social security 
administrators, police officers, and medical personnel are typically 
dealing with large numbers of individuals whom they are unlikely to 
see again, and even more unlikely to have known before.  The 
numbers of people they must regularly deal with not only render each 
individual anonymous to them, but also create a sense of being 
there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program.@  Schlesinger, 
supra, at 308-09.
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overwhelmed by work that cautions them against making any effort to 
reduce this anonymity; to begin giving people individualized attention 
would quickly make the job impossible to perform.21
There is, moreover, a proliferation of functions in the modern 
state that result from the need to manage mass society, and thus have 
no pre-modern analogue.  Modern people need to obtain driver=s 
licenses, passports, zoning variances, change of address forms, and a 
variety of other authorizations, each of which requires interaction 
with the government bureaucracy.   In all these relationships, there is 
no familiarity between the parties, little chance for empathy, and a 
basic uncertainty that the government official will even understand 
the real needs of the individual in front of them.22   Barbara Gutek=s 
leading study of customer relations in business firms concluded that 
most interactions with customers took the form of encounters, rather 
than relationships, that is, superficial, instrumentally-oriented 
interchanges that precluded any real human contact. 23   Interactions 
between government employees and citizens would appear to display 
similar characteristics.
It is important, of course, not to romanticize pre-modern 
times.  Familiarity was no guarantee against harsh treatment by one=s 
superiors, and life in a small, insulated town could be stultifying and 
oppressive in its totality.  Cities were generally regarded as places of 
freedom and opportunity during the medieval, Renaissance and 
Reformation periods,24 the famous slogan being that Acity air makes 
one free.@   By the eighteenth century, these cities had become large 
enough to offer their residents a certain anonymity, and this too 
provided an escape from the oppressiveness of ingrown, pre-modern 
societies.  But the freedom and anonymity that modern urban settings 
offer has never be regarded as including the freedom to receive harsh 
21
  Joel Handler & Ellen Hollingsworth, Reforming Welfare: The Constraints of 
the Bureaucracy and the Clients, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1167, 1177 (1970)
22
  Michael Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers (1984).
23 Barbara Gutek,  The Dynamics of Service: Reflections on the Changing Nature 
of Customer/Provider Interactions (1995)
24 See Weber, supra note [Economy and Society], at 1236-62.  One reason for this 
view is that the cities were outside the feudal system.
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treatment from the bureaucracy.  Indeed, administrative government 
can be seen as an effort to reassert control over people in the more
fluid, otherwise unsupervised circumstances of modern life.   The 
point, then,  is that familiarity and affective bonds of pre-modern 
society were not available as a palliative against this new form of 
control.  The freedom that the social circumstances of modernity had 
conferred on people could be undermined or extirpated by 
bureaucratic supervision, and the anonymity which had been a 
component of that freedom now left people alone and unprotected 
when this supervision turned abusive.
C.  Institutional Pathologies
A medieval lord owed certain obligations to his feudal 
superior, but in his treatment of the ordinary people on his property he 
was essentially unsupervised, while his seneschal or bailiff were 
answerable only to him.  The parish priest was part of a large, 
hierarchically organized institution, but he was also largely 
unsupervised in his quotidian interaction with his parishioners. 25
Modern administrative agents, however, are part of large, complex 
institutions, and these institutions often malfunction in a way that 
produces further forms of oppression.  Organization theory has amply 
documented a wide variety of such malfunctions.26  For example, the 
difficulty of managing a large institution, and specifying performance 
standards to control the action of their hundreds, thousands or tens of 
thousands of employees often lead them to establish goals whose 
25
  There were some broad constraints imposed by Christianity that did distinguish 
medieval society from its pagan predecessor.  No overlord, including the king, 
could indulge in the sorts of public debaucheries and hideous tortures that 
characterized the Roman Emperors,  Gaius Suetonious Tranquillas, The Twelve 
Caesars (Robert Graves, trans., 1957); see George Brauer, The Decadent Emperors: 
Power and Depravity in Third-Century Rome (1967), nor could he break up the 
families of his dependents.
26
  See generally Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory (1968); Jay 
Galbraith, Organization Design (1977); James March, Decisions and Organizations 
(1988);  James March & Herbert Simon, Organizations, (2nd ed. 1958); John Meyer 
& W. Richard Scott, eds., Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality 
(1983); Walter Powell& Paul Dimaggio, eds. The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis (1991) W. Richard Scott,  Organizations, (2nd ed. 1987).
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natural consequence is to harm the people that they are supposed to 
help.  Welfare and social security workers are often rewarded for 
minimizing the benefits that they provide, thus saving their 
department money, rather than for making sure that every eligible 
recipient receives the intended benefit; police officers are rewarded 
for making arrests and obtaining confessions, rather than for reducing 
crime; doctors and nurses at public hospitals may be encouraged to 
treat people quickly and discharge them, or to discourage them from 
using the hospital at all, rather than making a thorough assessment of 
their medical condition.27
Perhaps the best-known institutional pathology of 
governmental agencies is excessive formalism, popularly known as 
Ared tape.@28  The Very Important Person=s insistence that Akaky file a 
petition which would be submitted to Athe chief clerk, who would 
have transferred it to my secretary, and my secretary would have 
submitted it to me@ is an immediately recognizable example.   The 
term, however vivid, is not really self-explanatory.  It is obviously a 
metaphor, derived from the time when actual red tape was used to tie 
up batches of U.S. Federal Court documents. 29   One definition runs 
as follows: ARed tape refers to government measures that impede job 
creation and investment opportunities and diminish competitiveness 
by adding unnecessary, uncoordinated or unjustifiable requirements, 
restrictions, compliance, implementation or administrative costs to 
everyday business activities.@ 30  This definition itself verges on red 
tape by committing the closely-allied sin of being written in 
bureaucratize; in fact,
27
  See Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (1957); Wilson, supra note [ ], at 
113-36
28
  For official recognition of the term, see National Performance Review, Creating 
a Government That Works Better & Costs Less (1993) (alternatively titled AThe 
Gore Report on Reinventing Government).  The first chapter of the Report, id. at 
11-41, is entitled ACutting Red Tape.@  In addition, a third title that appears at the 
top of the title page, but not the cover, is AFrom Red Tape to Results.@
29
  www.geocities.com/wcraigjnb/redtape.html (visited on Jan. 3. 2005) (this being 
the practice from about 1790 to 1915)   [Word for the Wise]
30
  http://www.redtape.gov.on.ca/english/  (What We Do: What is Red Tape?) 
(visited on Jan. 3, 2005)
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it comes from a government agency, the Province of Ontario=s Red 
Tape Secretariat.  Its origin generates a disquieting impression that 
government cannot try to eliminate Ared tape@ without simultaneously 
succumbing to it.  
This may well be true; Weber=s classic definition of 
bureaucracy states: AThe authority to give commands required for the 
discharge of [official] duties is distributed in a stable way,@31 and AThe 
management of the modern office is based upon written documents 
(>the files=), which are preserved in their original or draft form, and 
upon a staff of subaltern officials and scribes of all sorts.@32  Insistence 
that people follow prescribed, written rules, and interact with 
prescribed, hierarchically subordinate officials, may be intrinsic to the 
structure of modern administrative government.  If so, the crucial 
word in the Ontario definition, and virtually any other definition of 
red tape, is Aunnecessary.@   The inevitable rules and restrictions of 
bureaucracy have an oppressive character, but unnecessary rules and 
restrictions are truly oppressive precisely because they are additional 
burdens imposed on citizens for no good reason.  Distinguishing the 
necessary from the unnecessary, however, is likely to be a difficult 
task.  If one opens the typically thick Office Manual or Employees=
Manual of a governmental agency, one is unlikely to find a statement 
that the any particular requirement is unnecessary.
D.  Divergent Incentives
Divergent incentives are perhaps the most familiar source of 
bureaucratic oppression because they are part of public choice 
analysis, or, more generally, of the microeconomic methodology that 
views human behavior as an effort by individual actors to maximize 
their personal self-interest.33   Public choice analysis argues that this 
31
  Weber, supra note [ ], at 956
32
  Id. at 957
33
See generally James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 
(1962); Daniel Farber & Philip Frickey, Law and Public Choice (1991); Dennis 
Mueller, Public Choice III (2003); Jonathan Macey, Public Choice:  The Theory of 
the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 43 (1988); 
Geoffrey Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story 
of Butter and Magarine, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 83 (1989). 
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predilection  will lead government officials to be concerned with 
achieving advantages for themselves, rather than fulfilling their 
obligation to serve the needs of the supposed beneficiaries.  The 
oppression that is likely to result from such divergent incentives is 
apparent.  What is not so obvious, however, is the nature of the 
interest that these officials are trying to maximize.  Public choice 
theory has had considerable success in modeling legislators as re-
election maximizers, but it has stumbled badly in its effort to identify 
the equivalent maximizing behavior for administrative agents.  
William Niskanen=s idea that they are trying to maximize their 
agency=s budget 34 has proven to be empirically untenable,35  while 
subsequent claims that they are trying to maximize their Aslack,@ or 
discretion,36 are only rescued from similar empirical falsification by 
their pervasive ambiguity.   A much more convincing hypothesis, but 
one that eludes public choice analysis,  is that many government 
agents are not trying to maximize anything, but rather trying to 
minimize work or hassle.37  That is certainly the impression conveyed 
by the clerk behind the metal counter.
The problem of divergent incentives, however, goes well 
beyond public choice analysis, or even the related hypothesis of 
34
  William Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971)
35
   See Herbert Kaufman, The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs 
(1981); Wilson, supra note [ ], at 118, 235-53.   A classic example of a federal 
agency that seemed to be striving to maximize its budget and expand its authority 
was the Federal Trade Commission of the late 1970s under the chairmanship of 
consumer advocate  Michael Pertschuk.  But closer analysis revealed that the 
agency was simply responding to Congressional directives.  See Barry Weingast & 
Mark Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory 
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ.  765 (1983).  The 
subsequent ire of Congress against the FTC resulted from the fact that the dominant 
view in Congress had changed, not from the agency=s independent action.  See 
Michael Pertschuk, Revolt Against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the 
Consumer Movement (1982).
36
  Jean-Luc Migue & Gerard Belanger, Toward a General Theory of Managerial 
Discretion, 17 Pub. Choice 27 (1974)
37
  It eludes public choice analysis because microeconomic analysis depends on 
maximizing behavior.
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hassle minimizing, and links directly to the problem of institutional 
pathologies.  As Charles Schultze and James Q. Wilson point out, 
government agents do not derive any  direct benefit from providing 
effective or gracious service.38   They work in institutions, and 
institutions exercise powerful effects over their members.  The formal 
rules and informal norms of their agency, the dense web of written 
requirements, institutional practice, supervision and peer relations, are 
almost invariably the primary determinants of their behavior.  One
specific manifestation of such institutional effects that runs directly 
counter to humane, effective service is group solidarity.  People=s 
instinctive sociability leads government officials to establish 
congenial, and in some cases truly friendly relations with their 
colleagues; they interact throughout the day, have lunch together, 
perhaps even socialize after work.  The citizens they serve, on the 
other hand, are strangers, as described above, and often unwelcome 
intrusions.
There are, undoubtedly, various other sources of bureaucratic 
oppression.39  One explanation that should be discounted, however, is 
Theodore Lowi=s claim that oppression results from an excessive 
grant of discretion to administrative agents.40   Discretion is an almost
uselessly vague term, but to the extent that it can be defined, 41 it 
38
  Charles Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest 66-83 (1977);  Wilson, 
supra note [ ], at 113-36.  
39
  Several commentators have observed that the excessively adversarial stance that 
U.S. agencies adopt toward those whom they regulate or serve is another 
institutional pathology that contributes to oppressive administrative behavior.  See 
Derek Bok, The Trouble With Government 163-68 (2001); Robert Kagan, 
Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (2001).
40
Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United 
States 92-126 (2nd ed. 1979).  See also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the 
Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 259 (1994); David Schoenbrod, Power 
Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People through Delegation 
(1993).
41
In the section of his book entitled ADelegation Defined,@ for example, Lowi never 
offer a definition.  See Lowi, supra note [ ], at 95-97.  For what is probably the 
leading effort to define the term, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31-
32 (1978).  Dworkin=s approach is related to the legal process approach of Hart and 
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probably does not exist in the administrative state. Virtually all 
administrative agents have some set of goals, whether effective or 
ineffective, client-centered or institution-centered, that they are 
expected to achieve by their hierarchical superiors.   Their actions, as 
noted above, are governed by a dense framework of institutional 
expectations and understandings. 42  To be sure, this framework may 
allow, or require that the agent make choices, but those choices are 
constrained by a variety of factors whose cumulative effect will be to 
eliminate the sense of freedom that the term discretion tends to imply. 
 Bureaucratic oppression, particularly as experienced by individuals,43
is more likely to result from the government agent=s scrupulous, 
perhaps mindless obedience to the applicable rules than from 
disobedience of those rules and the indulgence of caprice.  
II.  What is to Be Done? 44
Bureaucratic oppression is hardly an obscure phenomenon; 
not only is it apparent to any conscientious observer,  but, unlike 
other problems such as malnourishment or inadequate health care, 
every person who chooses to consider the subject is likely to have 
experienced it personally.  The causes of bureaucratic oppression, 
however, are so closely related to the inherent structure of modern 
government and modern society that the difficulty of finding a 
solution has been equally apparent.  While this sometimes induces a 
Sachs, see Vincent Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The 
Legacy of Hart and Sachs, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 413 (1987).
42
  M.P. Baumgartner, The Myth of Discretion, in Keith Hawkins, ed., The Uses of 
Discretion (1992), at 129; Martha Feldman, Social Limits to Discretion: An 
Organizational Perspective, in id. at 163;  Keith Hawkins, On Legal Decision-
Making, 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1161 (1986); Edward Rubin, Discretion and Its 
Discontents, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1299 (1997)
43
  Lowi=s sympathies are expressed exclusively for businesses.  Lowi, supra note 
[ ], at 108-113
44
  The reference to V.I. Lenin, What is to Be Done?: Burning Questions of Our 
Moment (1929) is only partially facetious.  Trotsky thought that bureaucracy was 
responsible for the demise of genuine Communism, see Leon Trotsky, The 
Revolution Betrayed: What Is The Soviet Union and Where Is It Going?  (Max 
Eastman, trans., 1937).  
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sense of fatalism, it has also elicited thoughtful proposals for 
fundamental change in governmental operations from a variety of 
academic disciplines.  Legal scholars have proposed the imposition of 
due process standards on government agencies, organization theorists 
in sociology and public policy have proposed client-centered 
management, and economists have proposed reliance on market 
incentives.  Moreover, these proposals are not merely academic; each 
has been implemented by political actors to significant extent.  This 
section will consider them in turn.
A.  Due Process: The Legal Solution
The rationale for using due process to combat bureaucratic 
oppression is a powerful one, and the way the concept was applied in 
practice was creative and sophisticated.  Originally, due process 
involved a set of rules governing the conduct of a civil or criminal 
trial.  The significance of these rules is that trials were essentially the 
only legal means by which the pre-modern state interacted with 
individuals.  Of course, the state also affected people by enacting 
legislation, but legislation is generally directed against large groups, 
which can protect themselves through the political process.  A group 
may lose out, of course; legislation may favor dairy farmers over 
vegetable oil producers, or optometrists over opticians,45 but that is the 
nature of the political process.  During the Progressive Era, a 
conservative Supreme Court thought it could use the due process 
clause to protect groups from legislation that disfavored them without 
good reason,46  but the resulting doctrine, termed substantive due 
process, proved untenable, and was ultimately abandoned by the 
Court. 47 The rationale for legislation cannot be effectively policed by 
45
See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).  For an account of the politics that 
accompany such legislation, see Geoffrey Miller, The True Story of Carolene 
Products, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 397.
46
For characteristic decisions, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); 
Adair v, United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 
(1915); Adkins v. Children=s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Tyson & Brother v. 
Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
 See generally Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, Yale Law Journal 18:454 (1909)
47
See Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See generally Howard Gillman, The Constitution 
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courts; virtually all legislation favors some group over another, and 
our system of majoritarian decision making allows government to 
make these choices, subject only to the constraint of politics in most 
situations.48
Individuals, however, rarely have access to the political 
process, and thus cannot look to this means of protecting their 
interests.  Conversely, there is no need to allow the government to 
choose among individual interests to preserve the process of 
majoritarian decision making.  Thus, when the government acts 
against individuals, additional constraints can and should be imposed 
to protect the interests of individuals and ensure that the government 
is acting fairly. This result is achieved by two principles, codified in 
the U.S. Constitution as the bill of attainder clause and the due 
process clause.49  The bill of attainder clause forbids Congress from 
passing legislation that imposes disadvantages on individuals.50  Thus, 
government may only disadvantage individuals by applying general 
laws to them, laws which are the product of the political process 
Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence 
(1993);  Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The 
Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (1992).
48
  Constraints on majoritarian decision making are imposed to protect basic human 
rights, such as free speech, and to protect the integrity of the political process itself. 
 This is the  import of the famous footnote 4 of  United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152n.4 (1938).  See Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene 
Products, 98 Harv.  L.  Rev. 713 (1985);  Jack Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.  L. 
 Rev. 275 (1989); Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the AInsider-
Outsider,@ U.  Penn. L. Rev. 1291 (1986); John Ely, Democracy and Distrust 
(1980).  In recent years, the Court has also imposed constraints on federal 
legislation to protect the rights of states, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997);  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), but there are strong 
arguments against this, see Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political 
Process (1980). 
49
  U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 9; Amend. V; Amend. XIV
50
  It is acceptable, from the perspective of human rights or fundamental fairness, to 
pass legislation favor specific individuals, but the practice is frowned on from a 
public policy perspective.  See Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public 
Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985); Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the 
Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 (1984)
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where they will have obtained whatever protection their group can 
provide.
The due process clause then imposes constraints of the way the 
government applies the law.  The purpose of these constraints, in 
essence, is to ensure that the disadvantages being imposed on an 
individual are authorized by a general law, where group protection is 
available.  
Since  the only mechanism that available to the state for 
applying legislation to individuals in the pre-administrative era were 
the courts, due process protections developed as a set of rules involve 
court proceedings, whether criminal or civil.  With the advent of the 
administrative state, however, agencies became the primary means for 
implementing legislation, and thus the primary means by which the 
state interacted with individuals.  The problem was that there was 
initially no established means of applying the due process clause to 
these non-judicial situations; thus, the first instinct was to declare that 
the clause did not apply at all, that administratively-implemented 
benefits were privileges, not rights. 51  This position was originally a 
product of the substantive due process era, when the misplaced 
empathy for property owners that led the courts to police general 
legislation was matched by a corresponding lack of empathy for wage 
earners and poor persons who depended on benefits created by the 
legislature and enforced by agencies.   Because the concept of due 
process was tied, conceptually, to judicial trials, however, the rights-
privileges distinction persisted for thirty years after the demise of 
substantive due process. 52  This suggests that the difficulty in 
applying due process protection to administrative action was 
conceptual, not political.
The conceptual difficulty was finally solved by abstracting the 
elements of due process from their civil trial context, so that they
could be applied in a broader range of settings, and specifically to the 
now-ubiquitous interactions between administrative agencies and 
individuals.  The case that began this development is probably 
51
McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (Judge Oliver 
Wendell Holmes).  See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
52
See, e.g., Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Nelson v. County of Los 
Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958); 
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
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Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 53  but the crucial decision is in 
the 1970 case of Goldberg v. Kelly. 54 Goldberg=s abolition of the 
right-privilege distinction was stated in an almost off-hand manner.55
The real work in the decision is the effort to identify the generalized 
elements of due process protection.   According to the decision, these 
are notice of the matter at stake, an oral or written hearing where each 
side is able to state its case,56 a neutral decision maker, and a decision 
based on the evidence and arguments presented.57  Having 
characterized the essence of due process in this manner, the Court 
was able to apply it, in a series of subsequent cases, to a wide variety 
of administrative settings.  In Matthews v. Eldridge, the Court held 
that only written submissions were necessary in social security 
hearings; 58 in Vitek v. Jones, 59 it fashioned a quasi-adversarial 
proceeding to determine whether prisoners could be transferred to a 
mental institution, and, most dramatically,  in Goss v. Lopez, 60 it 
53
  339 U.S. 306 (1950).  New York law provided that notice to beneficiaries of a 
common trust fund that the fund was being termination should be provided by 
newspaper publication.  Justice Jackson argued that the due process clause required 
more specific notice in cases where the beneficiaries were known to the trustee.   
He did so by detaching the concept of notice from the indictment or complaint of 
traditional trials, and then applying this generalized concept to the specific situation 
in the case. 
54
  397 U.S. 254 (1970)
55
  Id. at 262
56
  Id. at   267-71  The only matter that was truly at issue was whether a written 
hearing would be sufficient.  The Court required an oral hearing in the specific 
context of welfare termination, but implied that written hearings could be 
acceptable in other situations.
57
  Id. at 271
58
  424 U.S. 319 (1976)
59
  445 U.S. 480 (1980).  See also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) 
(establishing a quasi-adversarial hearing for placement of a prisoner in 
administrative segregation).
60
  419 U.S. 565 (1975)
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reduced the requirements to a minimum in order to apply them to 
week-long suspensions from public school.
The Supreme Court=s impressive conceptual success in 
generalizing due process protection for individuals so that it could be 
applied to administrative interactions was ramified by scholarly 
discussion.   The idea that trials in the pre-modern world, and 
administative due process in the contemporary one, protects 
individuals by requiring government to demonstrate that they belong 
within a category created by majoritarian legislation focuses on the 
role of due process in ensuring the accuracy of the state=s 
determination.  Jerry Mashaw and Frank Michelman pointed out that 
due process also serves a dignitary or fraternal  function by giving 
individuals a voice and requiring the government to respond seriously 
to their challenges or allegations.61   Tom Tyler then discovered, 
through empirical investigation, that government=s compliance with 
due process requirements lends moral authority to its determinations, 
and reconciles people to adverse decisions.62  He further found that the 
underlying reason for this effect is not only the perceived fairness of 
the due process-bound determination, but also the dignitary or 
fraternal effects the Mashaw and Michelson discerned.  Through their 
scholarship, these writers, and others, advanced the incisive point that 
administrative due process, in applying an abstracted, generalized 
version of the trial model, must incorporate the symbolic and 
dramturgical features of trials along with their fairness in determining 
the facts.  
Despite its grounding in our basic theory of government, and 
the sophistication with which it has been developed by both judges 
and scholars, generalized due process is seriously limited as a means 
of controlling bureaucratic oppression.   To begin with, it is limited to 
interactions between individuals and government that fall into the 
category of adjudications, that is, a final determination about whether 
to impose some disadvantage, or deny some advantage, to an 
61
  Jerry Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 
61 B.U. L. Rev. 885 (1981); Jerry Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process 
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in 
Search of a Theory of Value,   Frank Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims 
in Procedural Due Process, 18 Nomos (Due Process) 126 (1977)
62
  Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990)
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individual.  But most of the interactions that give rise to bureaucratic 
oppression lie well outside this category.  Gogol=s Very Important 
Person is not making a determination at all, but only demanding, 
however harshly,  that Akaky follow established procedures; 
similarly, the crabby official behind the metal counter is simply 
informing the hapless applicants that they have chosen the wrong line. 
 Much oppression resides in the informal, quotidian contacts between 
individuals and government officials.  Both due process decisions and 
due process scholarship emerge from the discipline of law, and suffer 
from that discipline=s disproportionate emphasis on adjudicatory 
action.  The field simply fails to provide an adequate conceptual 
framework for addressing non-adjudicatory interactions.
Even within the ambit of adjudication where legal analysis 
prevails, due process requirements do not necessarily provide a 
solution to the problem of bureaucratic oppression.  The pursuit of an 
adjudicatory remedy requires a certain rights-orientation, an 
optimistic confidence in one=s own position and abilities, that is often 
precisely what is lacking in recipients of government assistance.  To 
say that people who are capable of obtaining benefits by pursuing an 
adjudication are probably those who do not require benefits in the 
first place would be going to far.  But clearly, many people who 
receive benefits or services from government B the disabled, the sick, 
the elderly, the young, the very young, the mentally deficient and 
deranged B are precisely those whose vulnerabilities preclude 
assertion of their rights.  Like consumers generally, the are more 
likely to Alump it@ then to enter the foreign, and seemingly perilous 
territory of legal action.  Lawyers or other professional representatives 
can supply the required sense of confidence and outrage, but they are 
formidably expensive, and often just as foreign and frightening as the 
legal system, to which they unmistakably belong.  Legal services 
lawyers are an exception on both counts, but they are in increasingly 
short supply, perhaps, if one wants to be cynical, for that very reason.
There is, moreover, some question whether due process 
requirements really serve to decrease bureaucratic oppression, even 
when the aggrieved individual can obtain legal representation, or 
when the adjudication is so informal that most people can assert their 
claims on their own, as in the case of school suspension hearings.63
63
  As established by Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).  This situation is quite 
rare, however.  The Court claimed that it applied to adjudications involving 
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The image of a hearing that ensures an accurate application of the 
law=s general categories to individuals, or, better still, that conveys a 
sense of fairness and respect,  is an appealing one, and not without 
factual foundation.  There is, however, the countervailing image 
conjured up by Malcolm Feeley=s study of the New Haven criminal 
courts, which is tellingly entitled The Process is the Punishment. 64
Legal procedures can be an instrument of oppression, rather than an 
antidote to such oppression; they can immerse the average person in a 
foreign world where strange, barely-comprehended rituals that lead to 
potentially disastrous results.  While law-trained people see  logic, 
dignity, and protection from government oppression in judicial and 
judicially-based procedures, others may see an Alice in Wonderland 
farrago, where strange creatures speak gibberish, and the presiding 
official shouts AGive your evidence . .  and don=t be nervous, or I=ll 
have you executed on the spot.@ 65   Most significantly, they may not 
see protection from government authority but an exercise of that 
authority, a situation that Carroll portrayed by having the King, who 
presides at Alice=s trial, wear his crown on top of his wig. 66  The 
informality of bureaucratic process may make the situation worse, not 
better.  A feature of Kafka=s law courts that makes them seem 
particularly sinister is that they are placed on the top floor of 
tenements, insinuating themselves into people=s lives without the 
liminal warning that ceremony and formality provides.  67
veterans= benefits in Walters v. National Ass=n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 
305 (1985), but the opinion is entirely unconvincing.
64
  Feeley, supra note [ ].
65
  Lewis Carroll, Alice=s Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking Glass 
147 (Martin Gardner, ed., 1960)
66
  Id.  144   Carroll thought this a sufficiently significant image to make it the 
frontispiece of his book, a decision which he refers to in the text, see id.; id at 
16.   
67
  Franz Kafka, The Trial 43-49 (Willa & Edwin Muir, trans., 1937).   To be sure, 
the primary meaning of Kafka=s law courts is almost certainly religious,, but they 
are also a satire on middle European bureaucracy, and it is the simultaneously 
metaphysical and mundane character of his imagery that makes the novel so 
effective.
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B.  Client-Centered Governance: The Management Solution
Management theory, as developed through the disciplines of 
sociology and public policy analysis offers an entirely different 
solution to the problem of bureaucratic oppression.   Instead of 
imposing externally-generated requirements on government agents, 
the management approach attempts to change these agents= internal 
attitudes.  In particular, the aspiration is to instill an ethos of client 
orientation, a prevailing attitude that the people for whom the agency 
provides benefits or services are to be treated as clients, or better still, 
as customers.  According to the Gore Report, an action plan drafted at 
the beginning of the first Clinton administration that summarized the 
work of a study group called the National Performance Review, 
Agovernment agencies must do what many of America=s best 
businesses have done: renew their focus on customers.@68  The report, 
moreover, documents a number of cases where agencies actually 
implemented this approach. 69
Michael Barzelay provides a more systematic account of 
client-centered administration.70  The first step, he suggests,  is to 
identify the customer with care: AA customer relationship is a 
mutually adjustive working relationship in which the provider=s main 
purpose is to meet the user=s needs.@ 71   One  danger to be avoided is 
expanding the idea of a customer beyond the boundaries of this 
relationship:  AThe potential consequences of identifying as customers 
the people obligated to comply with norms include misstating the 
principal purposes of compliance organizations and dissipating the 
conceptual force of the term customer.@ 72  After the customer has 
68
  National Performance Review, supra note [ ], at 44; see generally id. at 43-64 
(section entitled APutting Customers First.@
69
  Id. at 45-47 (describing programs run by the IRS, the Social Security 
Administration and the Postal Service)
70
  Michael Barzelay, Breaking Through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing 
in Government 102-114 (1992)
71
  Id. at 110.
72
  Id. at 107
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been identified, the agency must decide the particular kind of service 
that it should be providing.  The best source of information about this 
is the customers themselves.  While the customers= perceptions  are 
not necessarily accurate, they should be accepted unless a persuasive 
argument can be made for contradicting or ignoring them.  Thus, 
customer evaluations can be used to assess and readjust agency 
procedures.  To foster an ethos of customer service, control functions 
should be separated from service functions, and assigned to a 
different unit of the agency.
A particularly thoughtful and creative assimilation of this 
management theory into legal scholarship is described by its 
proponents as New Public Governance.  One of its primary themes is 
that command and control regulation is ineffective, and should be 
replaced by a more collaborative approach.73  When applied to 
government provision of goods and services, this approach suggests 
that those receiving benefits or services from government should be 
consulted about both the design and implementation of the program.  
In fact, the approach is sufficiently general that it can be applied to an 
extremely wide range of government interactions with individuals, 
including the treatment of drug offenders.  Describing the use of drug 
courts to replace the standard criminal sanction, Michael Dorf and 
Charles Sabel write: AThe central feature of this governance system is 
that the monitored agents choose their own precise goals and the 
means for achieving them in return for furnishing a central authority 
with the information that allows evaluation of their performance. . .. 
[B]y collaborating in this way, central authority and decentralized 
actors can together explore and evaluate solutions to complex 
problems that neither alone would have been likely to identify, much 
less investigate or address, without the exchanges with the others. The 
73
 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending 
the Deregulation Debate (1992); Eugene Bardach & Robert Kagan, Going By the 
Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness (1982); John Braithwaite, To 
Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety (1985); Jody Freeman, 
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997); 
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance 
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342 (2004); Susan Sturm, 
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001)
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same exchanges of information, moreover, enable the institutions 
continually to adjust their means and ends in the light of experience.@74
Despite the broad support that it engenders, and the 
intellectual sophistication of its proponents, client-centered 
management suffers from serious limitations as a response to the 
problem of bureaucratic oppression.   Like policy analysis in general, 
its implicit audience is a rational policy maker who exists only in 
theory; when attention focuses on real-world actors, the 
recommended policy takes on the character of a moral exhortation.  
Neither is without its value, to be sure.  It is useful to know the 
optimal strategy to achieve a given result, that is, the strategy that a 
perfectly rational decision maker, unencumbered by political 
constraints, would find persuasive.  Similarly, exhortations from 
scholars often prove to me more influential than might be expected, 
particularly over long periods of time.  But the problem of 
bureaucratic oppression is one that is specifically resistant to either 
optimal strategies or moral exhortations.   No one is in favor of 
bureaucratic oppression, and while some administrators may adopt it 
as a conscious approach to deter citizen users and save money, few 
could be said to do so justifiably.  As described above, the real causes 
of bureaucratic oppression are deeply-embedded structural factors:  
status differences, stranger relations, institutional pathologies, and 
divergent incentives.  Thus, the task is to counteract these structural 
factors, to reduce or eliminate the impediments that prevent 
conscientious policy makers from providing the kind of service that 
they know is preferable.  Telling them that a client-centered strategy 
is the optimal approach, and exhorting them to adopt that strategy, 
simply fails to address the real problem.
To explain the mechanism by which his client-centered 
approach would be implemented, Barzelay writes:  AIn a typical 
customer relationship, users believe that providers should be 
accountable to them (and perhaps to other parties) for [meeting the 
users= needs] and providers recognize that they ought to be so 
accountable.@ 75   This makes a good deal of sense, but the term 
74
  Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent 
Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831 (2000).
75
  Barzelay, supra note [ ], at 110.  This sentence appears in a section with the 
hortatory title: ABe Accountable to Customers.@  Id. at 109.  
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Aaccountable@ is undefined, and, in fact, it conceals a crucial 
ambiguity. 76 It implies that one person is answerable to another, and 
must conform his or her behavior to the other=s desires.  But the 
primary means by which this is achieved, in a modern context, is 
through administrative supervision.  We often speak of election as 
providing accountability, but the connection between being elected by 
a group of people and being subject to ongoing, detailed supervision 
is rather large, so that the term accountability, as used in this context, 
seems to be more metaphorical than operational.77   The main point is 
that the users, or Acustomers@ of a government agency are not in a 
position to supervise that agency=s officials in any sense, not even the 
attenuated sense in which voters supervise elected officials, and 
clearly not in the robust sense in which an administrative superior 
supervises a subordinate.   That is precisely where the problem of 
bureaucratic oppression resides.  In theory, and on the basis of moral 
exhortation, these officials should of course be accountable to the 
people whom the legislature has instructed them to serve.  But 
because of status differences, stranger relations, institutional 
pathologies and divergent incentives, they are simply not accountable 
in any real sense.  
Studies of customer relations in business firms suggest a 
further difficulty with client-centered governance.  These studies, 
engendered by the shift from a manufacturing to a service and 
information economy 78 have observed that management efforts to 
induce employees to be pleasant, helpful and generally customer-
oriented often produce routinized, stereotyped behaviors that generate 
76
  Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative 
Impulse, ___ Mich. L. Rev. _____ (forthcoming, 2005)
77
  Id. at ____
78 See Ash Amin, ed., Post-Fordism ((1994); Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-
Industrial Society (1974); Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, 
Society and Culture, vol. 1: The Rise of Network Society151-324 (1996); Michael 
Piore & Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity 
(1984).  In fact, several observers argue that the sociology of work remains tied to 
the older model of industrial production, and has failed to take full account of this 
transition.  See Macdonald & Sirianni, supra note [ ]; Holly McCammon & Larry 
Griffin, Workers and Their Customers and Clients, 27 Work & Occupations 278 
(2000).  
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resentment among employees and provide customers with little more 
than empty gestures.79   If this is true in private enterprise, where the 
employees are providing services to customers and the crucial choices 
generally lie within the customer=s control, it is probably much more 
true in government, where the employees are often exercising 
authority, and the citizen has few, if any options.  Thus, the only 
effect of an agency=s efforts to make its employees more customer-
oriented may be that the now-resentful employees say AGreat to see
you.  Have a nice day.@ after having provided the same peremptory 
treatment.
New Public Governance provides a partial response to these 
difficulties by emphasizing the importance of collaboration with the 
customers regarding the agency=s  implementation strategy, and 
perhaps even its norm or policy formation.   This establishes a 
dynamic relationship that allows the customers to interact with the 
agency on a continuous basis, and thereby become a structural 
component of the agency=s behavior pattern that can counteract the 
structural features discussed above.  For example, if a social service 
agency regularly consults with advocacy groups and focus groups of 
individual recipients in designing and revising its mode of 
distributing benefits, these groups will be part of the agency=s 
decision making apparatus.   They will thus produce an effect on the 
agency without having to rely on the agency=s self-imposed 
commitment to be client-oriented.   In addition, it avoids relying on 
externally-imposed rules that are derived from a judicial model, and 
are thus of limited relevance to the day-to-day realities of the 
administrative setting.
While New Public Governance thus represents an important 
conceptual advance that incorporates insights from management 
theory and the sociology of institutions into legal analysis, its 
recommendations have significant limitations of their own.   To 
government officials at the operational level, the demand that they 
engage in a collaborative relationship with the beneficiaries of their
program is as external a demand as the imposition of due process 
requirements.  This is not necessarily fatal, since institutional change 
79 Karl Albrecht & Ron Zemke, Service America!  Doing Business in the New 
Economy  (1985); Gutek, supra note [ ]; Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart: 
Commercialization of Human Feeling (1983); Robin Leidner, Fast Food, Fast Talk: 
Service Work and the Routinization of Everyday Life (1993)  
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must begin from somewhere.  The problem is that the mechanism for 
continued implementation of the collaborative approach is attenuated. 
 It is true that the clients have been incorporated into the decision 
making structure.  The difficulty is that all the inherent structural 
features that generate bureaucratic oppression B status differences, 
stranger relations, institutional pathologies and divergent incentives B
will continue to operate.  The clients will continue to be seen as low 
status individuals; the obligation to consult with them will strike most 
officials as a burden and an intrusion; the inclination to follow 
procedures, and use those procedures as a means of avoiding difficult 
or trying situations will continue; and the officials will still have the 
same divergent incentives as before.  New Public Governance 
represents a real advance, but it depends on a rather sunny view of 
public officials, an expectation that they will be more conscientious, 
more flexible, and more willing to collaborate with clients than is 
actually the case.
C.  Market Mechanisms: The Microeconomic Solution  
A third way of combating bureaucratic oppression involves 
the use of market mechanisms.  Based on microeconomic analysis, 
this approach is directly addressed to the  divergent incentives of 
administrative agents,  but offers an overall solution through the 
assertion, characteristic of this field, that individual incentives are the 
decisive factor  in determining human and institutional action.  
Market mechanisms are thus designed to avoid the defects in the 
previously described solutions; they are not externally-imposed rules, 
and they do not depend on the good will or conscientiousness of the 
administrators.  Rather, the idea is to create a situation where people=s 
personal self-interest, the source of all human action in 
microeconomic analysis, will lead to the elimination of bureaucratic 
oppression.  In his study of bureaucracy, James Q. Wilson contrasts 
the mild but ubiquitous oppression of the long lines and the bored 
official behind the metal counter with the cheerful politeness and 
efficiency of the nearby McDonalds,80 a cheerfulness that has become 
virtually emblematic of the new service society.  81  His explanation 
80
  Wilson, supra note [ ], at 113.  The government office he describes is the 
Registry of Motor Vehicles.
81 See Ritzer, supra note [ ].
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for the difference is that McDonalds is operating in the market, where 
self-interest and good service are aligned. 82
The idea of market mechanisms actually consists of  two 
different approaches to the problem of bureaucratic oppression.  The 
first approach involves the literal use of these mechanisms, that is, 
relying on market mechanisms by diminishing the scope of 
regulation, benefits and services that the government provides.  The 
second is an effort to incorporate market mechanisms into the 
operation of administrative government by changing the way that 
administrative agencies are structured.  These are independent 
solutions; they can be readily combined, and often are, since they are 
based on the same theory of human action, but they can also be 
implemented separately without impairing their effectiveness in any 
way.
Diminishing the scope of administrative regulation, benefits 
and services is a popular idea these days,83 and has been implemented 
in a variety of settings.  Most of the true deregulation occurred during 
the Carter administration.84  Benefit and service reduction has been 
implemented during subsequent years, particularly in the social 
welfare area,85 although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
between ideologically-based reductions and reductions driven by 
budgetary shortages.  The consequence, in all these cases, is that an 
area previously addressed through a government program is now 
being controlled by the market; airline prices are now set by market 
competition, not the Civil Aeronautics Bureau, individuals who 
82
  Id. at 115-36.  Wilson notes that government agencies, unlike a private firm, A(1) 
cannot lawfully retain and devote to the private benefit of their members the 
earnings of the organization (2) cannot allocate the factors of production in 
accordance with the preferences of the organization=s administrators, and (3) must 
serve goals not of the organization=s choosing.@  Id. at 115.
83
  See James Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan 
(1975); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974)
84
   Martha Derthick & Paul Quirk,  The Politics of Deregulation (1985); Thomas 
McCraw,  Prophets of Regulation 222-99 (1985)
85
  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 205 (1996), codified at 42 U.S.C. '' 601-17 (2002) (replacing the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program).
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welfare benefits are terminated must now depend on their the  market 
value of their labor, or their parents= labor, for their sustenance.86
Whatever the general virtues and vices of this approach, it 
suffers from some serious defects as a solution to the problem of 
bureaucratic oppression.  To begin with, it is fragmentary; despite the 
fervent dreams of the far right, there is no realistic possibility that the 
administrative state will be dismantled.  The demands for personal 
security, economic security and social justice by citizens of modern 
states are simply too insistent, and any government that chose to 
ignore these demands would risk rapid dissolution.  It is true that 
voting majorities in the United States have been willing to scale back 
administrative programs providing for economic security, probably 
because racial division decrease their sympathy for the poor, but how 
willing would these same majorities be, particularly after the World 
Trade Center attack, to scale back administrative programs providing 
for personal security?  
A second problem with replacing administration with the 
market is that is does not necessarily reduce the amount of oppression 
that individuals experience.  As John Kenneth Galbraith observes, the 
large firms that dominate the market in many areas are themselves 
bureaucracies.87  Wilson responds that they are different kinds of 
bureaucracies because private firms are subject to market discipline, 
that is, their well-being depends directly on the caliber of goods and 
services that they provide.88   The difficulty, however, is that the 
bureaucratic nature of the firm may insulate the individuals within the 
firm from the feedback mechanisms of the market.89  Like government 
officials, their behavior to their customers may be governed by status 
differences, stranger relations, institutional pathologies and divergent 
incentives.  Agency problems of this sort are common in large firms; 
86
  See Neil Komesar,  Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, 
Economics, and Public Policy (1994) (political intervention and the market are 
alternative modes of social organization)
87
  John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1967).  See also Oliver 
William son, The Mechanisms of Governance 219-49 (1996)
88
  Wilson, supra note [ ], at 134-36.  
89
  See Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (1985)
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McDonalds employees may be polite to customers who come in to 
order a hamburger, but the now-deregulated airline employees may 
not be as helpful to the long lines of irate customers on the other side 
of their metal counters, despite some vaguely-understood connection 
between customer satisfaction and the ultimate economic health of 
their employer.90 Moreover, even if employees of private firms are 
more polite than government agents in their manner of treating 
individual customers, the firm itself may subject these customers to 
other types of oppression.  The polite McDonalds employees are, after 
all, dispensing McDonalds food, which may well be lowering its 
customers= long-term life expectancy.   Moreover, if McDonalds were 
not regulated by public health authorities, its food might lower some 
customers= short-term life expectancy. Private firms oppress 
individuals by polluting their environment, selling merchandise with 
hidden defects, and siphoning large sums off to their executives, 
legally and illegally.  These firms have no incentive to concern 
themselves with any of these problems unless they become public in a 
way that affects their bottom line.  Just as the World Trade Center 
crisis indicates our need for administrative government, the Enron 
crisis indicates the dangers to which private, relatively unregulated 
firms subject us. 
A second, and distinctly different use of market mechanisms 
is to alter the incentive structure of administrative agencies, rather 
than replacing these agencies with market actors.   One means of 
doing so is to set up a situation in which government institutions or 
programs compete with each other, like private firms, to obtain a 
source of income.    In school voucher programs, for example, parents 
can choose among a variety of public schools, and the school then 
receives a fixed amount of public money for each student who 
enrolls.91  Another approach, where such competition is impractical, is 
90
  Wilson is somewhat scornful of Galbraith=s work.  He writes: AProfessor 
Galbraith=s book appeared at a time (1967) when American businesses were 
enjoying such unrivaled success that its beautifully crafted sentences seemed to 
capture some enduring truth.  But the passage of time converted many of those 
eloquent phrases into hollow ones.@ Id. at 134.  It would seem, however, that by the 
time Wilson=s book appeared (1989), he should have been aware of the agency 
problems in large firms  that modern microeconomics had explored.
91
 See Clint Bolick, ed.,  Voucher Wars: Waging the Legal Battle over School 
Choice (2003);  John Coons & Stephen Sugarman,  Family Choice in Education: A 
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to place a single agency on a receipt and expenditure basis, so that its 
budget depends on the service it provides.  This is only possible for 
certain agencies, namely those that can be supported by user fees, 
such as highways, mass transit services or recreational facilities; it is 
obviously impossible for agencies that distribute benefits such as 
welfare or housing.  An alternative is to simulate a receipt and 
expenditure situation by counting certain agency achievements as an 
economic input, or by counting the costs that the agency imposes as 
an expense.   Robert Litan and William Nordhaus recommend the 
creation of a regulatory budget, where each agency would be 
allocated a fixed amount of costs that it could impose on private 
industry.  92  The Gore Report recommends the creation of one-stop 
worker training and retraining centers that would compete with one 
another for funding based on the number of people who used each 
center, and the results that they achieved. 93
But creating either real or simulated market mechanisms for 
public agencies has serious limitations as a means of reducing 
bureaucratic oppression.  The establishment of real market 
mechanisms constitutes a policy decision that may have serious 
detriments; it can distort  private behavior, impose economically 
regressive costs, and induce the legislature to cut public funding.94
Model State System for Vouchers,(1971); James Dwyer,  Vouchers Within Reason: 
A Child-Centered Approach to Education Reform (2002);   Jerome Hanus & Peter 
W. Cookson, Choosing Schools: Vouchers and American Education (1996); 
Richard Kahlenberg, ed.,  Public School Choice vs. Private School Vouchers 
(2003);   David Kirkpatrick, Choice in Schooling: A Case for Tuition Vouchers 
(1990); Terry Moe, Schools, Vouchers, and the American Public (2001); John 
Witte,  The Market Approach to Education: An Analysis of America's First 
Voucher Program (2000).  The seminal work in this movement is Coons and 
Sugarman, supra; the seminal implementation was in the Alum Rock, California 
school district, see Daniel Weiler,  A Public School Voucher Demonstration: The 
First Year at Alum Rock (1974).
92
   Robert Litan & William Nordhaus,  Reforming Federal Regulation (1983)
93
  National Performance Review, supra note [ ], at 49-50.
94
  See  Ernest House,  Schools for Sale: Why Free Market Policies Won't Improve 
America's Schools, and What Will (1998); Richard Musgrave & Peggy Musgrave, 
Public Finance in Theory and Practice (1973) (user fees and other special taxes are 
less efficient than raising funds through general income taxes because they have a 
distorting effect on behavior)  
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Bureaucratic oppression, however serious, may not rise to a level that 
justifies such a profound reorganization of essential public services.  
School vouchers are championed for the more basic reason that they 
will improve the intrinsic quality of education, not because the 
teachers will treat the students more respectfully, and user fees for 
national parks are championed on grounds of social justice, not 
because they will make the park rangers more polite.  Even if the 
problem of bureaucratic oppression is seen to justify profound 
changes in public financing, the solution is not necessary directed at 
the problem.  Many other factors, including ability to pay,  contribute 
to people=s willingness to incur user fees.  Imposing user fees on 
recreational facilities may convince poor people to stay home with 
their children and watch television, no matter how gracious the park 
official have become.
Simulated market mechanisms suffer from the same difficulty 
in targeting the specific problem of bureaucratic oppression.  In 
addition, their use of artificially-determined valuations, or funny 
money, makes these programs complicated to administer, and 
potentially inaccurate.  Real markets provide an enormous amount of 
information, largely for free; 95 collecting an equivalent amount of 
information, so that the simulated mechanism is sufficiently accurate 
to serve its purpose, may lie beyond the capacities of government.   
Ultimately, simulated market mechanisms may not be much of an 
improvement on the Office of Management and Budget=s cost-benefit 
analysis, 96  which is a good deal simpler, and has nonetheless been 
subject to extensive criticism.97
95
  See Schultze, supra note [ ], at 19-20.  For example, assessing the value of a 
bank=s loans to third-world countries used to be a formidable, time consuming 
enterprise, requiring extensive knowledge about the particular country, its fiscal 
structure, and general economic trends.  With the creation of a secondary market in 
third world debt, the necessary information is now listed in the newspaper.
96
 Exec. Order No. 13, 258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9, 385 (Feb. 26, 2002) (George W. Bush).  
See James Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: 
An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 Duke L.J. 851 (2001); 
Harold Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 533 (1989).
97
  See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Why Regulatory Review Under 
Executive Order 12, 291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do 
About It, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 167 (1994); Alan Morrsion, OMB 
35
III.  Dangerous Clients: The Phenomenological Solution 
Bureaucratic oppression remains a ubiquitous problem and, 
given its structural origins, an intractable one.  The solutions 
discussed above B due process, client-centered management and 
market mechanisms B are all useful efforts to combat the problem, but 
each has its limitations.  This section offers a somewhat different 
solution based on the ombudsperson concept that has been 
implemented in a few places in the United States, and more 
extensively in Britain, Canada India, and the European Union.  It too 
has limitations, but it is directed to the structural issues that generate 
bureaucratic oppression, and avoids some of the difficulties of other 
solutions.  Although it draws on the same disciplines as these 
solutions, namely law, public policy, sociology and economics, it is 
primarily based on phenomenology, and specifically on the 
application of phenomenology to the sociology of individuals and 
institutions.   
A.  The Phenomenology of Danger
The collapse of the Roman Empire during the late fifth 
century, or, more specifically, the collapse of the Empire=s ability to 
impose civil order ,98  led to a highly decentralized mode of 
governance in Western Europe.  For about one thousand years, 
warrior aristocrats ruled territories of variable size, with a variable, 
but always considerable amount of independence.  While they were 
organized in a clearly defined hierarchy, with the king or emperor at 
the top, and knights or castellans who controlled small territories at 
the bottom, each of them was considered a noble, or free man, as 
opposed to the serfs who farmed his lands.   Each, whether he had 
several levels of subordinate nobles below him or several levels of 
overlords above him, was entitled to defend his rights, and assert 
Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 
Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1986); Richard Pildes & Cass Sunstein, Reinventing the 
Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1995). 
98
  Whether the Roman Empire actually collapsed at this time is a matter of 
controversy among historians.  See  Henri Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne 
(1939)
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purported rights against his fellow nobles.99  Because the kings and 
emperor were not capable of imposing civil order, this defense and 
assertion of one=s rights was often accomplished by violence. 100
The Western world=s concept of manners, and specifically the 
respectful treatment of another human being, originated in these 
circumstances.101  It is striking how gracious, how genuinely 
considerate, one will behave toward another person when that person 
can justifiably kill you for acting disrespectfully.  This is not merely a 
question of fear, although fear obviously plays a role.  Fear, or 
resentment, is likely to be the dominant reaction to a highwayman or 
pirate B also quite common in the medieval era due to the lack of civil 
order B who is holding a knife to one=s throat.  But a fellow nobleman 
is not simply someone who can kill you, but someone who can kill 
you justifiably.  Thus, his dangerousness is not a violation of the 
social order, but an assertion of it, and it is this combination that 
confers status and engenders genuine respect. The connection 
between dangerousness and status is not based on a microeconomic 
explanation of human behavior, but on phenomenology.  
Microeconomics, which treats people as self-interest maximizers, can 
certainly explain why people would respond to threats of violence 
with a wariness that might resemble respect, but it has difficulty 
distinguishing between justified or unjustified threats, and cannot 
explain why such wariness would be transformed into genuinely 
respectful feelings.  According to phenomenology, however, people 
are primarily motivated by the desire to create meaning for 
themselves.  Each person stands at the center of a set of subjectively 
perceived experiences, and has no access to knowledge that lies 
99
See generally Marc Bloch, Feudal Society (L.A. Manyon, trans.) (1961);  R. Van 
Caenegem, Government, Law and Society in J.H. Burns, ed., The Cambridge 
History of Medieval Political Thought c.350 - c.1450, at 174 (1988); Georges Duby, 
The Chivalrous Society (Cynthia Postan, trans.) (1977); Heinrich Fichtenau, Living 
in the Tenth Century: Mentalities and the Social Order (Patrick Geary, trans.) 
(1991);  F.L. Ganshof, Feudalism (Philip Grierson, trans.) (1996); David Herlihy, 
The History of Feudalism (1970).
100 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process  (Edmund Jephcott, trans., 1994):  vol. 
2: State Formation and Civilization, at 263, 448-51 
101
  Id., vol. 1: The History of Manners, at 1
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outside that ambit of experience.  102  Knowledge that lies beyond the 
individual=s experience, including social knowledge, must be 
transmitted to the person through an intersubjective process.103  In 
fact, such knowledge is necessary for all but the most primeval 
thoughts, and the world that each individual perceives, though a 
matter of personal experience, is an interpreted world, interpreted by 
the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes society and culture.104
The individual must then integrate this knowledge with personal 
experiences and emotions to create a meaningful totality. 105
Thus, the fear engendered by a dangerous person is combined 
with the intersubjective interpretation of that person as justified in 
eliciting that fear.  This combination of emotion and knowledge is 
then given meaning by according the individual respect, or social 
status.  The sense of respect is generated by each individual=s need to 
102 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 65-69 (Dorion Cairns, trans.) (1993); 
The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 103-11 
(David Carr, trans.)(1970) [hereinafter cited as Crisis];  Edmund Husserl, Ideas: 
General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology 45-50, 91-96 (W.R. Boyce Gibson, 
trans.) (1962) [hereinafter cited as Ideas]; M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception 3-12, 203-42 (Colin Smith, trans.) (1962)   For a more extensive 
discussion, see Edward Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics 
and Phenomenology, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1705 (1998)
103 Husserl, Crisis, supra note [ ], at 161-67, 244-57; Husserl, Ideas, supra note [ ], 
at 94; Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World  97-138 (George 
Walsh & Frederick Lehnert, trans.) (1967).  As Husserl states: Ain living with one 
another each one can take part in the life of the others.  Thus in general the world 
exists not only for isolated men but for the community of men; and this is due to the 
fact that even what is straightforwardly perceptual is communlized.  Crisis, supra 
note [ ], at 163 (emphasis in original).  
104
  Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic (Dorion Cairns, trans) 
(1969);  Husserl, Ideas, supra note [ ], at 235-59;, Schutz, supra note [ ], at 45-96.   
105
  Schutz=s work represents one way of translating Husserl=s insights into social 
science.  Another approach, which focuses more on social practices than 
individualized meaning, is ethnomethodology.  See, e.g., Harold Garfinkel, Studies 
in Ethnomethodology (1984); George Psathas, ed., Everyday Language: Studies in 
Ethnomethodololgy 1979); (Roy Turner, ed., Ethnomethodology (1974).  Schutz=s 
interpretation seems preferable and is relied on here, not only because Husserl read 
and approved Schutz=s work, see Maurice Natanson, Edmunst Husserl: Philosopher 
of Infinite Tasks 106 (1973), but also because it is more philosophically 
sophisticated. 
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construct a meaningful account of his or her experience.  AWhy am I 
fearful of this person, and why does society protect that person=s 
ability to elicit that fear, rather than trying to protect me from the 
threat?@  The attitudes thus generated are then communicated 
intersubjectively.   Thus, reactions generated by the individual=s need 
to create meaning are then promulgated as social norms, and function 
as effective norms because they accord with their recipients= internal 
needs.  This recursive process, which is phenomenology=s solution to 
the macro-micro problem in modern sociology, explains how the 
inherent violence of medieval society, and the justification of that 
violence that followed from the lack of civil order, were transformed 
into components of a functioning social system.
In contrast to medieval society, the modern administrative 
state is characterized by high levels of civil order.  The 
monopolization of force by the central government that occurred 
between the Middle Ages and the present time has suppressed 
interpersonal violence, and led to a pacified, orderly and complex 
social system.106  But the increasingly complex and interdependent 
character of modern  society 107 generates a different, if less dramatic 
set of dangers.  Most people are dependent upon others for their 
livelihoods, and thus experience a sense of danger in dealing with 
those who are in a position to dismiss them, penalize them or 
stigmatize them.   These sanctions, moreover, are generally justified 
by society=s property rules, either alone or in conjunction with the 
institutional rules of private firms, just as violence in response to 
insult was justified in medieval society.   As a result, the medieval 
attitudes that accorded respect to military aristocrats have gradually 
evolved into modern attitudes that accord respect to those who can 
justifiably impose career-based sanctions.  As before, this respect is 
not simply an outward display based on a subjectively-experienced 
sense of fear, but a genuinely-felt response based on the 
phenomenological need to create meaning, and the intersubjective 
promulgation of that response throughout society.  
It is a sociological commonplace to observe that respect is 
based on social status.   Stated in this manner, however, the 
106 Elias, supra note [ ], vol 2.
107
  Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (1991); Anthony Giddens, 
The Consequences of Modernity (1990).
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observation is not particularly informative, since the two terms are 
often synonymous.  A more useful inquiry is to determine the sources 
of respect and social status, then to see whether there is any difference 
between the two, and whether any of those sources are variables that 
are amenable to public policy intervention.  The point of the 
foregoing discussion is to identify justifiable threat, or danger as a  
source of respect that is not equivalent to social status.   Fame confers 
high social status, and thus generates respect, for  non-dangerous 
persons; one can admire professional athletes or movie stars without 
being afraid of them.  Conversely, justified danger can generate 
respect for persons who lack the other attributes of social status.  
Thus, a possible antidote for bureaucratic oppression is to engender 
respect for the low status persons who receive benefits and services 
from government agencies is to make them justifiably dangerous to 
the officials in the agency.
Norbert Elias= The Civilizing Process, one of the truly great 
works of twentieth century social theory, provides further insight into 
the mentality of the administrative state, although from a somewhat 
different perspective.108   Noting the Western world=s gradual 
elimination of interpersonal violence due to the central government=s 
monopolization of force, Elias argues that the increasingly irenic 
behavior of individuals within this culture can be described as a 
civilizing process.  It is characterized by the internalization of social 
control, a set of personal attitudes, purchased at varying levels of 
internal distress depending on the nature of the individual, that 
suppress basic human desires for violent self-assertion or 
retaliation.109  This control arises from the increasingly 
interdependent nature of modern society, the differentiation of tasks 
that requires people to Aattune their conduct to that of others.@110
Thus, the  less dependent one person is upon another, the less the 
person=s livelihood or well-being depends upon that other person, the 
108 Elias, supra note [ ], vol 2.  Elias draws his model of human behavior from 
Freud, not from phenomenology, but his translation of Freudian psychology into a 
social theory ends up quite similar to Alfred Schutz=s similar translation of 
phenomenology, see Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World 
(George Walsh & Frederick Lenhert, trans., 1967)
109 Elias, supra note [ ], at 441-513.
110 Id.at 445.
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less Acivilized@ his behavior is likely to be.  This lack of civility will 
not be manifested as violence, since the state insists on maintaining 
its monopoly of force, but as vindictive, resentful or impolite 
behavior.
B.  A Dangerousness Proposal
A number of jurisdictions throughout the world have 
experimented with the use of ombudspersons.  An ombudsperson is a 
government official who is authorized to receive complaints about 
other officials and to take some sort of action based on those 
complaints.  Ombudspersons can also initiate investigations of their 
own to discover bureaucratic behavior toward individuals of the sort 
that might conceivably generate complaints, and then take the same 
sort of action.  Whether an official who only conducted investigations 
of this nature, and did not receive citizen complaints, should be called 
an ombudsperson is a definitional nicety that need not be pursued for 
purposes of this discussion.  It seems fairly clear, however, that the 
subject matter of the investigation must be the sort of action that 
might generate complaints; if it is misbehavior that does not have a 
direct effect on citizens, such as theft of government funds or  
disobedience of internal rules, we would tend to describe the 
government investigator in other terms.
 The idea of an ombudsperson was developed in Scandanavia, 
111
 and has been recently adopted by the European Union. 112  It has 
been used fairly extensively in the English speaking world, 
particularly in the United Kingdom, 113 Canada 114 New Zealand, 115 and 
111
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India.116  In the United States, it has generally been used for specific 
administrative programs at the federal level, 117 and implemented 
comprehensively in several states.118  In the U.K., there are three 
separate groups of ombudspersons, one at the national level and 
having general jurisdiction, a second at the national level with 
jurisdiction over health-related matters, and a third for local 
government.  Morever, the mechanism has proven so popular that 
many government agencies and even private firms have developed 
their own ombudspersons.119  In order to complain to the national 
ombudspersons, citizens must file their complaints with a member of 
Administration 391-455 (1997); Mary Seneviratne, Ombudsmen: Public Services 
and Administrative Justice (2002); H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative 
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the House of Commons, who then transmits it to the ombudsperson.  
This somewhat unusual arrangement makes the mechanism appear to 
resemble casework in the U.S., that is, interventions by legislators on 
behalf of important constituents. 120  In fact, the legislators in the U.K. 
perform a very general screening, or gate keeping function and 
transmit most of the complaints to the ombudsperson, rather than 
serving as the means of redress. 121    Once the ombudspersons have 
received the complaint, they investigate, and can then either advise 
the agency or recommend legislation.
Ombudsperson programs are designed to redress a range of 
problems regarding the performance of administrative agencies.  The 
paradigmatic problem that they seem to envision is a substantive one 
B the agency has given the individual incorrect information, or 
incorrect treatment B rather than the more atmospheric one of 
oppressive behavior.  This approach leads naturally to the sorts of 
advisory or hortatory responses that constitute the remedial repertoire 
of the existing programs.  If the agency has made an error, all that 
seems necessary is to bring that error to the attention of a responsible 
official.  That is, moreover, all that seems appropriate; there is no 
reason to punish the agency for the sorts of mistakes that inevitably 
occur in the complex process of administrative implementation.  If 
systematic errors occur, they would seem to stem from the design of 
the authorizing legislation, and are properly addressed by 
recommendations to the legislature for the revision of the statute.
Suppose, however, that the ombudsperson mechanism were to 
be used to combat bureaucratic oppression.  The problem here is not 
that its employees have made an error, but that they have engaged in 
conscious mistreatment of the individuals whose interests their 
agency is supposed to serve.   In the most extreme case, they have 
improperly terrorized and excoriated someone, as the Very Important 
Person did to Akaky Akakyevich.  In the more mundane and frequent 
case, they have treated someone with insensitivity and disrespect.   
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The best solution, it would appear, is to engender respect for the 
agency=s clients among its employees.  If agency officials genuinely 
respect the clients, they would not behave like Gogol=s Very 
Important Person, or like the bored, surly government clerk behind 
the metal counter.  They would be gracious and genuinely 
considerate, thus eliminating oppression even in cases where they 
were required to deny the individual=s request.
One means that might engender such respect is to make the 
clients dangerous persons for the employees.  This could be achieved 
by authorizing the ombudsperson to punish employees when she 
received complaints about them.  Every client would then represent a 
potential threat.   Oppressive behavior might always elicit a 
complaint, and a complaint might always lead to punishment.  
According to the rational actor, or microeconomic approach to human 
behavior, this would make the employee wary of the clients, because 
the clients would be capable of taking action that would ultimately 
impair the employee=s material self-interest.  But according to the 
phenomenological approach described above, it would have the more 
comprehensive and profound effect of making the employees feel 
genuine respect for their justifiably dangerous clients.  And in Elias=
related view, it would increase the interdependence of the employees 
and their clients, by placing the well-being of the employees within 
the clients= partial control.
If the rational actor, or microeconomic motivations were the 
only ones involved, then the ombudsperson proposal, in making 
clients more dangerous to employees, might represent a significant 
degradation of their work environment.  This result has in fact been 
observed by sociologists of work, in connection with both overt 
violence and confrontational behavior by customers.122  But, as 
indicated above, the phenomenological impact of danger is often 
respect, and such respect then becomes a basis for the creation of 
genuinely rewarding interactions.  An extensive empirical study of 
direct contacts between customers and employees in private firms 
found that employees often felt that personal interaction was the most 
satisfying part of their job, even when, or especially when, their 
122
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success depended upon the customers’ reactions to them.123 This 
result varied according to the nature of the firm, and could be 
counteracted by the presence of irate and unpleasant customers, but
its presence suggests that the need to please people could generate a 
sincere willingness to treat them in a friendly and helpful manner.
To achieve this result, the relevant governmental jurisdiction 
would need to create an ombudspersons= office as a separate agency, 
completely independent of all other agencies, although not necessarily 
of the legislature.  The ombudspersons would be authorized to receive 
complaints from individuals who believed that they had been treated 
poorly or improperly by an administrative official.  Phone numbers 
and web cites for the ombudspersons would be prominently displayed 
in government offices.  The ombudspersons could then investigate the 
complaint, and might also be authorized to investigate cases of 
mistreatment on their own initiative.  If they found that oppressive 
behavior had occurred, they would have authority to sanction the 
offending official.  Draconian sanctions, such as immediate dismissal, 
or even suspension from work, would be inappropriate except in the 
most egregious cases.  To begin with, most oppressive behavior, 
while objectionable, is less than catastrophic; no one likes to be 
treated rudely or unhelpfully, but such treatment very rarely causes 
death, as it did in Akaky=s case. 124    Second, officials must be 
accorded due process when they are sanctioned, and severe sanctions 
require too much process to be readily deployed.  Finally, the point is 
to change the attitudes of existing officials, not to decimate an 
experienced workforce.  Thus, the appropriate sanction, in most 
cases, would be administrative demerits, who consequence might be 
denial of a bonus or a raise at the end of the year.  Suspension or 
dismissal would result only if the employee accumulated a large 
number of demerits.  That would indicate a consistent pattern that 
was more serious than an occasional lapse, it would establish a record 
that would satisfy due process requirements, and it would be imposed 
only on the most intractable officials.
This proposal is distinct from existing ombudspersons 
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programs because it grants the ombudsperson authority to discipline 
administrative officials, quite apart from the authority that exists 
within the hierarchy of the officials= own institution.  It grants this 
authority because its purpose is not to correct errors, or detect 
systematic defects in the authorizing statute, but to combat 
bureaucratic oppression.  By making an agency=s clients dangerous B
by enabling them to initiate a process that can lead to a significant 
sanction for the employee B the proposal will engender not only 
instrumentally rational wariness on the part of the official, but 
phenomenologically experienced respect.  
C.  The Advantages of Dangerous Clients
Establishing an ombudsperson with authority to impose 
sanctions on administrators in response to client complaints is a 
structural solution to the problem of bureaucratic oppression.  It 
speaks directly to the status differences and divergent incentives that 
generate such oppression.  The instrumentally rational response to 
sanctions that microeconomics predicts would be a change in the 
incentives of bureaucratic agents when dealing with individual 
clients.  The meaning-based response predicted by phenomenology 
would engender more respectful attitudes toward those clients.  The 
proposal does not address the issues of stranger relations or 
institutional pathology directly, but takes account of them through its 
effect on status relations and incentives.  The institution=s clients 
remain strangers, but the sense of threat that now accompanies them 
reduces the extent to which they must rely on familiarity to palliate 
the impact of bureaucratic oppression.  The institution itself remains 
subject to organizational pathologies, but the forces acting on its 
employees can counteract these pathologies to some extent.   If  
market forces can counteract the institutional pathologies of business 
firms, as James Q. Wilson asserts, then other forces should be able to 
fulfill this same role for administrative agencies.
As a structural solution, the ombudsperson program resolves a 
number of the difficulties that afflict other solutions to the problem of 
bureaucratic oppression.    What distinguishes it from the due process 
approach is the informality of the complaint process.  Due process 
can only be applied to adjudications, or administrative proceedings 
that resemble adjudications, because it is essentially a set of rules for 
determining whether an implementing agency is correctly applying 
pre-established rules to a particular individual.  It would not extend to 
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being yelled at by a Very Important Person, or being told to stand in 
the another long line.  But  anything can be the subject of a complaint. 
 In addition, since the purpose of the complaint is merely to provide 
information to the ombudsperson, and initiate an investigation, 
complaints can take virtually any form, and thus do not require any 
legal knowledge, or even any degree of comfort with the legal system. 
  For the same reason, the ombudsperson can justifiably elicit 
complaints B by interviewing clients at random, for example, and 
asking them how they were treated.
Once the ombudsperson has investigated the issue, and 
decided to sanction a particular official, that official must be given 
due process.  But this applies to the way the substantive standard is 
imposed.  The standard itself, the criterion for judging the 
administrative agency=s performance, is whether it has engaged in 
oppressive treatment of individuals, adjudicatory or otherwise.  With 
a legally-based due process solution, due process is the substantive 
standard itself, that is, the only standard that is being imposed on the 
administrative agency is a requirement regarding its adjudicatory 
actions, not its general treatment of its clients.  The negative aspects 
of due process, the possibility that it can  become its own mode of 
oppression, stems from its role as a substantive standard.  This occurs 
when the means of controlling bureaucratic oppression becomes an 
end in itself.  Because the ombudsperson approach is less formal, its 
substantive standard can be defined as the problem in its totality, 
namely bureaucratic oppression, and thus avoid establishing 
intermediate standards that can lead to counterproductive results.
Unlike the idea of client-centered governance, the 
ombudsperson proposal avoids any appeal to the good will or the 
moral sensibilities of administrators, at any level.  Of course, to 
initiate any governmental reform, someone needs to show good will, 
in this case a willingness to combat bureaucratic oppression.  But 
since the basic problem resides in the attitudes of administrators, 
appeals to their good will are best avoided.   The preferable approach 
is to design a program that can be instituted by the legislature, the 
primary policy maker in each American jurisdiction, and then 
functions without further need for rational, public-oriented behavior.  
This is what the ombudsperson program does.  Once in place, it 
operates by applying sanctions to oppressive administrators, changing 
their behavior by appealing to their self-interest, and their attitudes 
through a phenomenological process that lies beyond their control.  
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The program should of course be accompanied by moral exhortation 
of its own.  It would be bizarre to say to administrators: AYou can just 
keep doing what you=ve been doing all along, but you=ll be sorry.@
This sort of super-positivist approach to law as an order backed by 
sanctions is what Hart criticized so effectively in The Concept of Law.
125
   Any program to combat bureaucratic oppression would be based 
on a general condemnation of the practice, an exhortation to 
administrators to avoid it, and internal efforts within each agency to 
decrease it.  But the ombudsperson program would add a forceful 
sanction, coming from outside the agency, to alter its existing 
practices.  The nature of the sanction, moreover, should reinforce the 
hortatory aspect of the legislation by changing attitudes, and not 
merely behavior.
The ombudsperson approach resembles New Public 
Governance because it incorporates the clients of an administrative 
agency into the agency=s structure; rather than merely admonishing 
administrators to be client-centered, it makes client-centeredness part 
of the agency=s incentive structure.  It has an advantage over New 
Public Governance because it does not require the clients to hold their 
own within that administrative structure.  In the New Public 
Governance approach, clients must possess the skills or the 
persistence to ensure that the administrators really pay attention to 
them, and respond to their expressed needs and desires.  With the 
ombudsperson program, clients only need to complain.  By doing so, 
they will enlist the services of a professional administrator who will 
have all the necessary skills.  On the other hand, New Public 
Governance is preferable because it involves more comprehensive 
participation by the clients, and a genuinely collaborative relationship 
between them and the agency.   Which approach will actually work 
better in practice depends on one=s views about the flexibility of 
administrators, and their willingness to listen to and learn from their 
clients.  In all probability, these qualities will vary from agency to 
agency, and from time to time.  The two approaches are not 
inconsistent however, because the ombudsperson approach, although 
based on more pessimistic assumptions about bureaucratic attitudes, 
is not simply intended to threaten administrators, but to generate an 
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internal feeling of respect for clients that is fully consistent with the 
genuine collaboration of New Public Governance.
Another way in which the ombudsperson program is 
consistent, and indeed supportive of, New Public Governance is that 
it provides a means of supervising semi-private entities as well as 
public ones.   One aspect of New Public Governance is an increased 
reliance on private parties to carry out functions previously performed 
by public agencies.126  Sometimes this involves the retention of a 
private contractor to run a program, like food services, or an 
institution, like a prison, as a profit-making activity.127  Sometimes it 
involves the assignment of regulatory authority to an existing or 
specially-created private organization, as provided by the recent 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.128  In any event, the ombudsperson program can 
be used as effectively to monitor the behavior of the employees in 
these private entities as it can to monitor the officials of the 
government agencies they have replaced.  The same complaint, 
investigation and sanctioning procedures would apply, and the private 
entity could be required to agree to these procedures as a condition of 
receiving its contract or authority.  To be sure, those who are 
particularly sanguine about this mechanism might argue that the 
competitive environment in which the private entity exists B the 
market in general, or the market for government business in particular 
B will render such external discipline unnecessary.  In that case, the 
ombudsperson would receive few valid complaints, and could be 
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eliminated after a period of time. But he familiar agencies problems 
that afflict private firms suggest that this is an over-optimistic 
scenario,  and that an ombudsperson in this setting would have plenty 
of business.
Finally, the ombudsperson idea is preferable to market 
mechanisms because it is applicable to the entire range of 
administrative agencies that interact with individuals.   It addresses 
the problem of bureaucratic oppression with a program that requires 
only the political will to address that particular problem.  Market 
mechanisms generally demand much more extensive changes in the 
administrative apparatus: either the outright abolition of government 
programs, or the transition from a centralized, hierarchically ordered 
system to one where individual units are granted semi-autonomy and 
encouraged to compete against each other.  However greatly such 
changes appeal to certain people, they are extremely controversial, 
and their opponents can point to very serious potential dangers that 
they might incur.  The effort to combat bureaucratic oppression of 
individuals need not, and should not, be used as a strategic device to 
secure these more far-reaching changes, particularly when it is not 
necessary to do so.
Conclusion
Bureaucratic oppression is a ubiquitous problem, stemming 
from inherent features of modern government, but it is not an 
inevitable one.  Administrative agencies, after all, are human artifacts, 
and can be changed to reflect our commitments.  What appears to be 
lacking thus far is the political will to address the problem, and an 
effective strategy for solving it.  This article is an attempt to remedy 
that second of those lacunae.  It proposes that the familiar, but 
somewhat underused idea of an ombudsperson could be adapted to 
remedy bureaucratic oppression.  The adaptation would give the 
ombudsperson more sanctioning authority than such officials 
currently possess, but the purpose would not be to punish, or even to 
deter, but to engender an internalized feeling of respect for the 
agency=s clients.  Gogol=s Overcoat ends with the ghost of Akaky 
Akakyevich returning to terrify the government officials who have 
taken such an oppressive, imperious attitude toward those whom they 
are theoretically supposed to serve.  The purpose of this proposal, 
however, is not to induce similar feelings of terror, but to alter the 
structure of administrative agencies so that the employees see their 
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clients as neither ghosts nor verminous intrusions, but as human 
beings. 
